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INTRODUCTION

Customary international law ("CIL") is sometimes referred to
as "international common law."1 In theory, however, CIL is not
created like common law through the incremental decision making
of tribunals, but rather results from the "general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
2
obligation."
Nonetheless, there is at least one area of CIL that is being
. Senior Fellow and Adjunct Professor, The Harrison Institute for Public Law,
Georgetown University Law Center.
1 See, e.g., Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding
Principle or Customary International Legal Right?, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 37, 38
(1994) ("Customary international law essentially is international common law.").
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 102(2) (1987).
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developed through a process that closely resembles the
development of common law by domestic courts: the "minimum
standard of treatment" which governments must accord to foreign
investors. 3 Although the minimum standard of treatment can
claim a long pedigree in international law through its roots in the
ancient doctrine of denial of justice,4 its content has always been
highly indeterminate, and the discussions of what types of
measures it prohibits have largely focused on how egregiously a
government's conduct must offend the sense(s) of justice of the
members of a tribunal in order to violate the standard.5 Recently
the vagueness of the minimum standard of treatment- and its "fair
and equitable treatment" component in particular-has become a
source of significant controversy due to its emergence as the most
frequently invoked standard of protection in investor-state arbitral
6
disputes.
In this Article, I argue that because the minimum standard of
treatment lacks a clearly defined content, it cannot constitute a
legitimate norm of international law. I further argue that this
defect cannot be cured, as has been suggested by proponents of the
3 The development of what is considered customary international law
("CIL") by tribunals rather than by state practice is a phenomenon which is by no
means limited to the minimum standard of treatment. See J. Patrick Kelly, The
Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 526 (2000) ("Much of
what is commonly termed CIL is judge-made or judge-confirmed law.").
Arguably, however, the role of tribunals in defining the content of the minimum
standard of treatment is particularly significant for at least two reasons. Most
areas of customary international law lack an effective enforcement mechanism,
particularly with regard to enforcement by private parties. See Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 832 (1997) (noting that
private parties generally lack standing to enforce CIL standards concerning
human rights before the International Court of Justice or other international
tribunals). The minimum standard of treatment, in contrast, can be enforced by
private parties through the investor-state dispute settlement process provided for
in most of the more than 2000 investment treaties. See infra note 23 and
accompanying text. Moreover, I am unaware of any other purported rule of CIL
for which it is so openly acknowledged that the decisions of tribunals rather than
state practice define the content of the norm. See infra notes 60-69, 84-87 and
accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 11-14, 60 and accompanying text.
6 See Rudolph Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in
Investment Treaties, 39 INT'L LAW. 87, 87 (2005) ("[Iun current litigation practice,
hardly any lawsuit based on an international investment treaty is filed these days
without invocation of the relevant treaty clause requiring fair and equitable
treatment.").
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minimum standard, by conferring the authority to define the
standard's content either on the existing system of ad hoc arbitral
tribunals or on a new appellate body. This approach would violate
nondelegation principles by giving international decision makers
the authority to create a continuously evolving international
common law of investor rights that would be binding on the
United States and extremely difficult for Congress to amend.
In Section 2 of this Article I address both the status of the
minimum standard of treatment as customary international law
and its widespread incorporation in investment treaties. In Section
3, I discuss the indeterminate and evolving character of the
minimum standard. In Section 4, I explain why this indeterminacy
renders the minimum standard illegitimate as an international
legal norm, and why nondelegation principles preclude resolving
the vagueness problem by conferring on international tribunals the
authority to define the content of the standard.
2.

THE SOURCE OF THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT
OBLIGATION - TRADITIONAL CIL, NEW CIL, OR TREATIES?

2.1. The Minimum Standardof Treatment as Traditional CIL
Commentators and international arbitral tribunals routinely
assert that customary international law includes a minimum
standard of treatment for foreign investment and foreign
investors. 7 These assertions, however, have never been supported
7 See, e.g., Award, Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, Case No.
91, International Center for the Settlement of Investment
ARB(AF)/00/3,
Disputes ("ICSID") (W. Bank) (Apr. 30, 2004) (noting that Article 1105 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement's ("NAFTA's") reference to the minimum
standard of treatment "refers to a standard existing under customary law");
121, ICSID (W.
Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
Bank) (Oct. 11, 2002) ("[T]he phrase 'Minimum standard of treatment' has
historically been understood as a reference to a minimum standard under
customary international law .... "); Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in InternationalInvestment Law 2 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation &
Dev., Working Papers on International Investment, Paper No. 2004/3, 2004),
("Under
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf
customary law, foreign investors are entitled to a certain level of treatment, and
any treatment which falls short of this level gives rise to responsibility on the part
of the State."); J.C. Thomas, Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA's
Investment Chapter, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 13-16, 2002), in 2002 AM. Soc. INT'L L.: PRO. OF THE 96TH
ANNUAL MEETING 9, 14 ("Awards of international tribunals and writings of
qualified publicists have expressed the view that there is an international
minimum standard of treatment that must be accorded to aliens and their
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by any comprehensive empirical study of the actual practice of
nations with regard to foreign investment, as presumably would
be required to demonstrate that it is the "general and consistent
practice of states" 8 to afford foreign investment a certain minimum
standard of treatment. 9 Indeed, given the indeterminacy of the
content of the minimum standard of treatment, it is difficult to
conceive of how such a study could be conducted. 10
Instead, accounts of the minimum standard of treatment
typically start with the 1926 decision of the U.S.-Mexico Claims
tribunal in the Neer case." Neer involved a claim by a United States
national that Mexican authorities had failed to adequately
investigate the murder of her husband, and that this failure
constituted a "denial of justice" in violation of international law.' 2
The Commission indicated that in order to constitute a denial of
justice a government's conduct must "amount to an outrage, to bad
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency." 3 The Commission concluded that the conduct of
property, below which a state cannot go."); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 58 (1995) ("[Ilt is generally accepted that
international law requires a minimum of fairness in the treatment of foreigners
and foreign investment .... "). But see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 328 (2d ed. 2004) ("[Ilt cannot be said with certainty that
there is an international minimum standard of treatment of foreign investment in
customary international law .... ").
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 102(2) (1987).
9 See Kelly, supra note 3 at 453 ("Properly understood, customary law is
empirical. It consists of those norms that a society, in fact, believes are legally
required."). Kelly argues that most CIL norms are not empirically based. See id.
("The asserted CIL norms of the literature ... are declared without either general,
consistent practice or clear evidence that the vast majority of states have accepted
the norm as a legal obligation.").
10 See infra Section 3.
11 L. F. H. Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60
(Mex./U.S.A. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926).
12 Id. at 60-61.
13 Id. at 61-62.
Although the doctrine of denial of justice is primarily
associated with judicial malfeasance, the Commission noted that it applies to
actions of the legislative and the executive branches as well. Id. at 61. See also id.
at 65 (Fred K. Nielsen, Commissioner, separate opinion) ("There can be no doubt.
. that a State is responsible for the acts of its rulers, whether they belong to the
legislative, executive, or judicial department of the Government, so far as the acts
are done in their official capacity." (quoting JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 51 (1910))).
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the investigation was not so deficient as to give rise to liability
14
under this standard.
The origins of the doctrine of denial of justice to which the Neer
15
tribunal referred can be traced back as far as ancient Greece.
Grotius and Vattel embraced the doctrine as part of the law of
nations, 16 which was viewed during the 17th and 18th centuries as
derived primarily from natural law.' 7 During the 19th century, the
natural law account was supplanted by the modern, positivist view
of the law of nations. According to this view, the law of nations is
rooted in the implicit consent of nations as demonstrated through
customary practice. 18 Yet, despite the rise of the positivist
Id. at 62.
15 The doctrine was closely linked to the right of reprisal:
14

[1]ong before the emergence of the modem State it was settled that an
individual who was wronged in a strange land and who had there been
unable to obtain reparation for this injury from the local sovereign might,
with the permission of his own prince, initiate forceful measures to
obtain that justice which had been refused him. The practice had come
to be established in ancient Greece as a legitimate international
procedure for exacting compensation when justice could not be obtained
by peaceful methods.
ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF
JUSTICE 54 (1938). See also Hans W. Spiegel, Origin and Development of Denial of
Justice, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1938) (discussing the history of the doctrine of denial

of justice from the period following the collapse of the Roman Empire).
16 See Spiegel, supra note 15, at 73 (discussing Grotius' ideas on the denial of
justice) and 75-76 (explaining Vattel's concept of the denial of justice).
17 See Douglas J. Sylvester, InternationalLaw as Sword or Shield? Early American
Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 65-78 (1999)
(discussing the dominant view in the United States during the late-18th century
that the law of nations was grounded in natural law).
18 Vattel played a critical role in the shift from natural law to the positivist
model by asserting that customary practice, in addition to natural law, could give
rise to obligations among nations. As Vattel stated:
[c]ertain maxims, and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed by
nations in their mutual intercourse with each other as a kind of law, form
the Customary Law of Nations, or the Custom of Nations. This law is
founded on a tacit consent, or, if you please, on a tacit convention of the
nations that observe it towards each other. Whence it appears that it is
not obligatory except on those nations who have adopted it, and that it is
not universal, any more than the conventional law.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (Joseph Chitty

ed., 1852) 62 (1758). The reliance on custom and tacit consent gradually replaced
reference to natural law as the dominant approach to the law of nations. See
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 511 (1998) ("As the
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approach to international law, the doctrine of denial of justice
endured into the early 20th century as part of the natural law
legacy of the law of nations without any attempt to justify it based
on the actual practice of nations. 19
2.2. The Minimum Standardof Treatment as New CIL
Since World War II a proliferation of bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs") and a more liberal approach to defining
customary international law have led to a new argument for the
status of the doctrine of denial of justice as CIL. More than 2000
BITs were ratified during the second half of the 20th century, 20
most of which included an obligation to provide foreign investors
with the "minimum standard of treatment" to which they were
entitled under customary international law. 21 The "minimum
standard of treatment" was a broad concept intended to
encompass the doctrine of denial of justice along with other aspects
of the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens. 22
Significantly, the BITs also provided for "investor-state" dispute
settlement, which permits individual investors -rather than their
national governments - to bring claims under the agreements
before international arbitral tribunals. 23
nineteenth century progressed, courts and commentators began to embrace
positivism. As a result, the natural law conception of international law faded and
was replaced by an emphasis on state practice and consent."); Kelly, supra note 3,
at 508-09 (describing the development of the positivist theory of customary
international law during the 18th and 19th centuries). It has been suggested that
the state consent theory, in turn, has yielded to a "common consent" approach
under which the content of CIL can be determined by reference to the consensus
of an overwhelming majority of nations. Id. at 510.
19 See Spiegel, supra note 15, at 80 (describing denial of justice as "an offspring
of the Law of Nature").
20 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67 (2005) ("From 1959 to 2002, nearly 2200 individual BITs were formed ....
."); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary
InternationalLaw, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 27, 28 (2004) ("[I]n the last quarter
century, more than 2000 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been
concluded.").
21 See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
22 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 138-42 (describing the relationship
between the minimum standard of treatment and the body of international law
addressing state responsibility for injury to aliens). For a discussion of the content
of the minimum standard of treatment, see infra Section 3.
23 See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
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The wave of BITs coincided with the controversial efforts to
promote acceptance of a "new customary international law" of
human rights, based upon declarations of the United Nations
General Assembly and other international instruments rather than
on evidence of consistent state practice. 24 The "new CIL"
methodology has been widely criticized for not being grounded in
actual state practice. 25 Nonetheless, proponents of the view that
CIL includes a minimum standard of treatment for foreign
investors have enthusiastically embraced the "new CIL" approach,
arguing that a minimum standard of treatment for foreign
investors has become part of CIL based upon the widespread
inclusion of the concept in BITs. According to Stephen Schwebel, a
former President of the International Court of Justice:
The process by which provisions of treaties binding only
the parties to those treaties may seep into general
international law and thus bind the international
It is
community as a whole is subtle and elusive.
law.
to
international
nevertheless a real process known

[W]hen BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in
accordance with customary international law, they should
REV. 1521, 1539-45 (2005) (discussing the investor-state investment arbitration
process).
24 See Bradley & Goldsmith supra note 3, at 838-42 (describing growing
acceptance since World War II of CIL norms based on treaties and other
"international pronouncements" rather than state practice); see also Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modem and
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L. L. 639, 640 (2000) ("[The
new CIL approach] derives norms of CIL in a loose way from treaties (ratified or
not), U.N. General Assembly resolutions, international commissions, and
academic commentary .... "); Kelly, supra note 3, at 484-85 ("The premise of 'new
CIL' methodology is that unanimous and near-unanimous resolutions and
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly and other international fora constitute
a consensus on legal norms providing clear evidence of the opinio juris of
nations.").
25 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & and Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 328
(1997) ("There is much debate about how this new CIL is made and identified.
One thing, however, is clear: This new CIL does not reflect the actual practice of
states.") See also Kelly, supra note 3, at 485 ("The traditional criticism of 'new CIL'
methodology is that it is not based on general and consistent state practice, but
rather on non-binding verbiage. Resolutions are said to declare law or the
international community's normative conviction, rather than law evolving as a
social phenomenon.").
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be understood to mean the standard of international law
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant
BITs. The minimum standard of international law is the
26
contemporary standard.
Similarly, the tribunal in Mondev v. United States asserted that:
[T]he vast number of bilateral and regional investment
treaties (more than 2000) almost uniformly provide for fair
and equitable treatment of foreign investments, and largely
provide for full security and protection of investments.
Investment treaties run between North and South, and East
and West, and between States in these spheres inter se. On
a remarkably widespread basis, States have repeatedly
obliged themselves to accord foreign investment such
treatment.
In the Tribunal's view, such a body of
concordant practice will necessarily have influenced the
content of rules governing the treatment of foreign
investment in current international law. 27
Critics have responded to the attempt to use the BITs to
establish a minimum standard of treatment for foreign investment
by noting that the failure of attempts to negotiate a multilateral
investment treaty indicates that there is not sufficient agreement on
the existence of a minimum standard of treatment to support a rule
of CIL.28
26 Schwebel, supra note 20, at 29-30; cf. Kelly, supra note 3, at 501-503
(describing reference to BITs as evidence of the proper standard for compensation
for expropriation under customary international law). But see Bernard Kishoiyian,
The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary
InternationalLaw, 14 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 327, 329 (1994) ("[Elach BIT is nothing
but a lex specialis between parties designed to create a mutual regime of
investment protection ....uncertainty in the law on investment protection [makes
this necessary, but it]... cannot be removed on a universal basis by these treaties
as they do not consistently support definite legal principles.").
27 Award, Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
117, ICSID (W. Bank) (Oct. 11, 2002). Mondev involved a dispute over a failed
development project between a Canadian corporation, the City of Boston, and the
Boston Redevelopment Agency. The corporation brought a claim under NAFTA
Chapter 11 arguing, inter alia, that a ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Court
that the Redevelopment Authority enjoyed statutory immunity from suit over the
dispute violated the minimum standard of treatment. The NAFTA tribunal
rejected this claim, but indicated that under some circumstances a government's
granting immunity from suit to a public agency could constitute a violation of the
minimum standard of treatment. See id.
151-54.
28 See Sornarajah, supra note 7, at 159 ("[BITs] cannot create customary
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2.3. The Minimum Standard of Treatment as Treaty Obligation
Arguably, however, the debate over whether CIL includes a
minimum standard of treatment for foreign investors is largely
irrelevant if the objective is to establish that existence of such a
norm. The BITs and various regional agreements such as NAFTA
not only establish the minimum standard of treatment as a treaty
obligation, but make it enforceable through investor-state dispute
settlement; establishing that the minimum standard of treatment
29
would exist as a binding (albeit largely unenforceable)
requirement under CIL in the absence of these agreements is
30
unnecessary to establish the existence of the obligation.
Nonetheless, customary international law does play an
important role to the extent that it defines - or fails to define - the
minimum standard of treatment. Investment treaties generally
provide little guidance on the content of the minimum standard of
treatment, but instead define it by reference to CIL. 31 As discussed
international law. The projects to bring about multilateral agreements on
investment have been significant failures indicating the variety of viewpoints that
are taken on this issue even among developed states.") See also Kelly, supra note 3,
at 503 ("The recent failed attempt to negotiate a comprehensive agreement to
protect trade-related investment during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
confirms that there is not yet a consensus on the core principles of investment
protection.").
29 Even the most enthusiastic proponents of the CIL of investor protection
have not argued that the right to investor-state dispute settlement has become
part of CIL as a result of its widespread inclusion in BITs. See, e.g., Schwebel,
supranote 20, at 30 ("In view of the treaty-specific nature of grants of international
jurisdiction, and the presumption that states are not amenable to international
adjudication unless they consent to it, it would not be tenable to suggest that BIT
provisions that afford arbitral recourse have themselves found their way into the
body of customary international law.").
30 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 328:
[I]t cannot be said with certainty that there is an international minimum
standard of treatment of foreign investment in customary international
law . . . [blut, where there is a treaty on investment which makes
reference to an international minimum standard, the treaty conclusively
establishes the existence of the standard as between the parties.
As Professor Sornarajah notes, tribunals convened pursuant to Chapter 11 of
NAFTA have acknowledged the controversy over the existence of a minimum
standard of treatment in CIL, but have indicated that NAFTA resolves the issue
among the NAFTA Parties. See id. at 328-29 and n.32, citing ADF v. United States,
178, and Mondev v. United States, 120.
31 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 330 ("[T]reaties limit [the minimum
standard of treatment's] meaning to the circumstances in which it was recognised
in customary international law as conceived by the major capital-exporting
states").
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below, however, just as CIL is largely irrelevant in establishing the
existence of a widely enforceable minimum standard of treatment
norm, it has also thus far proven incapable of providing clear
guidance on the content of the standard.
3.

THE CONTENT OF THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF TREATMENT

From its origins in the doctrine of "denial of justice," the
content of the minimum standard of treatment for foreign
investors has always been highly indeterminate. 32 The tribunal in
Neer acknowledged the vagueness of the standard, quoting John
Bassett Moore's observation that it is "[not] practicable to lay down
in advance precise and unyielding formulas by which the question
of a denial of justice may in every instance be determined." 33 The
Neer tribunal offered its own characterization of denial of justice
not as a "precise formula," but rather only as an incremental
34
improvement on the standard as articulated by Moore and others.
One commentator, writing a decade after Neer, referred to the term
denial of justice as "a compromise in words ... [that] amounts to a
postponement of the decision" as to whether government conduct
32 See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 207 (4th ed. 1949) ("[T]he
international standard cannot be made a matter of precise rules. It is the standard
of the reasonable state; reasonable, that is to say, according to the notions that are
accepted in our modern civilization."); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy,
and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 66 (2003)
("[I]ncongruity has become the hallmark of decisions involving the minimum
standard of treatment .... ."); Ren~e Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to
Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV.
229, 248 (2001) ("The minimum standard of treatment for aliens is related to what
is known in international law as 'denial of justice.' 'Denial of justice' is, however,
much easier to state than to define. One prominent jurist has called this doctrine
'one of the oldest and one of the worst elucidated in international law.'") (quoting
Charles de Visscher, Le dini de justice en droit international, 52 RECUEIL DES COURS
369, 369 (1935 II)); Stefan Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United
States and Free Trade Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, 24 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 451, 495 (2003) (" [The Doctrine of Denial of Justice] has been
both respected and maligned, and its meaning has always been extremely difficult
to pin down-making it a challenging doctrine to apply to particular facts.");
Spiegel, supra note 15 at 80 (asserting that denial of justice can "hardly be defined
in a purely rationalistic way, and it is, therefore, particularly cherished by those
All attempts at definition are
who hope to derive benefit from its obscurity ....
arbitrary and in no way precise.").
33 L. F. H. Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60,
61 (Mex./U.S.A. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926) (quoting John Bassett Moore in Paul
S. Reinsoh, The Fourth InternationalConference of American Republics, 4 AM. J. INT'L
L. 777, 787 (1910)).
34 Id. at 61.
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in any given case will be judged to violate the international
35
standard.
The inclusion of minimum standard of treatment provisions in
over 2000 investment treaties since Neer was decided has done
little to clarify the content of the standard. 36 The indeterminacy of
the standard began to generate significant controversy as a result
of its inclusion in Article 1105 of NAFTA, which led for the first
time to the assertion of the standard in investment claims brought
against the United States.
Article 1105 states that "[elach Party shall accord to
investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security." 37 Two issues in particular regarding
Article 1105 proved contentious: (1) whether the term "fair and
equitable treatment" imposed obligations in addition to those
contained within the CIL minimum standard of treatment; and (2)
whether the reference to "treatment in accordance with
international law" referred to treaty law as well as customary
38
international law.

35 Spiegel, supra note 15, at 81.
36

See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 331:

cannot contribute to
[T]he increasing spread of investment treaties ..
the identification of the content of an international minimum standard as
none of the treaties seeks to describe the content of this standard. They
merely make reference to this standard. The .. .assertion that this
numerical explosion of treaties must have some meaning hardly gives
content to the standard. The number of repetitions of the same notion is
immaterial if the content of it is not identified. Emptiness multiplied
several times over can still produce only emptiness.
See also Dolzer & Stevens, supra note 7, at 58 ("Nearly all recent BITs require that
investments and investors covered under the treaty receive 'fair and equitable
treatment,' in spite of the fact that there is no general agreement on the precise
meaning of this phrase.").
37 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1105(1), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. "Full protection and security"
refers to the obligation to provide foreign investment with "reasonable" police
protection under the circumstances, but does not require governments to
guarantee the safety of an investment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 711, cmt. e (1987) ("A state does not
guarantee the safety of an alien or of alien property, but it is responsible for injury
when police protection falls below a minimum standard of reasonableness.").
38 See generally Charles H. Brower, II, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under
NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 9 (2002) (discussing the
"different conclusions about the body of 'international law' to which Article 1105
refers and the extent to which 'fair and equitable treatment' subjects public
regulation to international scrutiny."); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA
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Addressing the first issue, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v.
Canada concluded that Article 1105's reference to "fair and
equitable treatment" was "additive" to the requirements of the
customary international law minimum standard, and therefore
required it to determine whether the treatment of the investor had
been fair "free of any threshold that might be applicable to the
evaluation of measures under the minimum standard of
international law." 39 The tribunal based this reading of Article
1105 on its conclusion that the NAFTA minimum standard of
treatment provision was based on similar provisions in the BITs,
which the tribunal interpreted as requiring that foreign investors
be provided with fair and equitable treatment in addition to the
40
standard of treatment provided for under international law.
Applying this "additive" interpretation of fair and equitable
treatment, the tribunal concluded that Canada's conduct of an
audit of the claimant related to Canada's quota system for exports
of softwood lumber to the United States violated the minimum
standard of treatment. 41
Other early decisions interpreting NAFTA's minimum
standard of treatment provision addressed the second issue by
indicating that violations of other sections of NAFTA- or even
other international trade agreements - constituted violations of the
minimum standard of treatment as well. In Metalclad v. The United
Mexican States, for example, the tribunal indicated that a Mexican
municipality's denial of a permit for the construction of a
hazardous waste landfill by a United States investor violated the
minimum standard of treatment because it violated NAFTA's

Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues and Methods,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1427-29 (2003) (exploring whether, for purposes
of Article 1105, "international law" merely meant custom or also included treaties
and general principles of international law).
39 Award, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, (Award on the Merits of Phase 2)
105-118, (Apr. 10, 2001), reprinted in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
COMMENTARY 29-30 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., 2003).
40 Id.
111-16. The tribunal also noted that investors could use the most
favored nation provision of NAFTA to claim entitlement to the "additive"
standard for fair and equitable under the BITS. Id. T 117.
41 Id. TT 156-81. The tribunal indicated that the audit violated the standard
for fair and equitable treatment because the investor was "subjected to threats,
denied its reasonable requests for pertinent information, required to incur
unnecessary expense and disruption in meeting . . . requests for information,
forced to expend legal fees and probably suffer [sic] a loss of reputation in
government circles." Id. 81.
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transparency provisions. 42 Similarly, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, the
tribunal indicated that its conclusion that Canada's ban on the
export of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") violated Chapter 11's
national treatment provision "essentially establishes a breach of
43
Article 1105 as well."
The claimant in Methanex Corp. v. United States attempted to
extend this approach to the minimum standard of treatment even
further, arguing that "[a]ny violation of an international principle
intended for the protection of trade or investment is also a
violation of the NAFTA Article 1105 requirement that state
measures be fair, equitable, and in accordance with international
law." 44
Methanex, the claimant, argued specifically that
California's ban on the fuel additive MBTE-of which Methanex
made a component-violated provisions of two World Trade
Organization ("WTO") agreements and therefore violated
45
NAFTA's minimum standard of treatment provision.
Before the tribunal could rule on Methanex's minimum
standard of treatment claim, NAFTA's Free Trade Commission
("FTC") issued an interpretive statement in an attempt to rein in
the expansive interpretations of Article 1105.46 The interpretive
statement indicated that Article 1105 did not require treatment "in
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment" and that "[a]
determination that there has been a breach of another provision of
the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not
47
establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105."
42 Award,
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1,
74-101, ICSID (W. Bank) (Arbitral Trib. 2000), reprinted in 40
I.L.M. 36 (2001).
43 S.D. Myers v. Canada,
266, Arbitral Tribunal, Doc. 742416:01 (Nov. 13,
2000), availableat http:/www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersv
canadapartialaward final_13-11-00.pdf.
44 Claimant Methanex Corporation's Draft Amended Complaint, Methanex
Corp.
v.
United
States
61
(Feb.
12,
2001),
available
at
http://naftaclaims.com/ Disputes/USA/Methanex/MethanexAmmendedStatem
entOfClaim.pdf.
45 Id. at 58-64 (arguing that California's ban on MBTE violated provisions of
the WTO's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures and therefore violated Article 1105 of NAFTA).
46 See NAFTA, supra note 37, art. 2001(1) (explaining that the FTC is
comprised of one representative from each of the NAFTA Parties). See id. art.
1131(2) (providing that interpretations by the FTC are binding on tribunals
established under Chapter 11).
47 Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to Chapter 11 (July 31, 2001),
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The interpretive statement generated significant controversy
concerning whether the FTC had effectively amended Article 1105
and therefore exceeded its authority. The Pope & Talbot tribunal
indicated that "were the Tribunal required to make a
determination whether the Commission's action is an
interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter." 48 The
tribunal avoided the issue, however, by concluding that Canada's
conduct violated the minimum standard of treatment even as
explicated in the interpretive statement.49 Several commentators
have similarly questioned the validity of the interpretive
statement. 50
Given the indeterminacy of the body of customary
international law to which the interpretive statement refers,
however, it has done little to clarify the minimum standard of
treatment or the meaning of "fair and equitable treatment." In
Mondev v. United States, for example, after extensive discussion of
the interpretive statement the tribunal offered the following
characterization of the minimum standard of treatment as
reprinted in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY 2 (James R.
Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., 2003):
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International
Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to
be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of
the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish
that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
47 (May 31, 2002). The claimant in
48 Award, Pope & Talbot v. Canada
Methanex similarly suggested that the Interpretive Note constituted an ultra vires
attempt to amend NAFTA. See Investor's First Submission re: NAFTA FTC
Statement on Article 1005, at 17-20, Methanex Corp. v. United States, (Sept. 18,
2001).
49 Award, Pope & Talbot v. Canada
65, 67-69 (May 31, 2002).
50 See, e.g., Brower, supra note 38, at 10 ("[T]ribunals might conclude that the
[interpretive statement] represent[ed] an ultra vires amendment of the NAFTA.");
Murray J. Belman, Remarks to the American Society of International Law, in AM.
Soc. INT'L PROC., supra note 7, at 12, 13 (questioning whether the American
interpretive statement constituted an "amendment that is beyond the power of the
Free Trade Commission").
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applicable to judicial actions:
[T]he question is whether... a tribunal can conclude in the
light of all the available facts that the impugned decision
was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that
the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable
treatment. This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard,
but it may be that in practice no more precise formula can be
51
offered to cover the range of possibilities.
Despite the interpretive statement's failure to provide clear
guidance on the minimum standard of treatment, it has become
part of the standard model for United States investment
agreements, and similar language has been included in recent
United States free trade agreements ("FTAs") and BITs.52
Arguably, this new U.S. model has actually exacerbated the
controversy over the content of the minimum standard of
treatment by contributing to the development of variant
formulations of the minimum standard in different BITs and FTAs.
The U.S. model represents one class of agreements that confine fair
and equitable treatment to CIL, whereas another (larger) class of
agreements permit "additive" interpretations of fair and equitable
51 Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Case No.
95, ICSID (W. Bank) (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
ARB(AF)/00/3,
http://ww.state.gov/documents/organization/34643.pdf (emphasis added). See
also Brower, supra note 38, at 9 ("[T]he recent Notes of Interpretation ... leave
ample room for debate".); Courtney C. Kirknan, Fair and Equitable Treatment:
Methanex v. United States and the Narrowing Scope of NAFTA Article 1105, 34 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 343, 390 (2002) ("The FTC Interpretation has not completely
clarified the scope of Article 1105, however. In tying fair and equitable treatment
to the international minimum standard, new debate has begun as to the meaning
of the international minimum standard."); Yannaca-Small, supra note 7 at 40:

It would be inappropriate at this stage to establish a definitive
interpretation of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard. The
jurisprudence which has applied it and identified elements of its
normative content is relatively recent and is not uniform, and therefore
does not allow for a firm and conclusive list.
52 See, e.g., U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.5(3), Aug. 17, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco-FTA/
FinalText/SectionIndex.html ("A determination that there has been a breach of
another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement,
does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article."); 2004 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5(3), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/38710.pdf ("A determination that there has been a
breach of another provision of this Treaty, or of a separate international
agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article.").
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treatment that are not rooted in CIL.53
There are, however, certain consistent themes in the recent
attempts of tribunals and commentators to summarize content of
the minimum standard of treatment. There appears to be broad
agreement that it encompasses international versions of both
substantive and procedural due process. 54 The U.S. model BIT and
recent U.S. FTAs emphasize this aspect of the minimum standard
of treatment, stating that "fair and equitable treatment" includes
the obligation not to deny justice in "criminal, civil, or
administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the
53

See Yannaca-Small, supra note 7, at 40:

Because of the differences in its formulation, the proper interpretation of
the "fair and equitable treatment" standard depends on the specific
wording of the particular treaty, its context, the object and purpose of the
treaty, as well as on negotiating history or other indications of the
parties' intent. For example, some treaties include explicit language
linking or, in some cases limiting, fair and equitable treatment to the
minimum standard of international customary law. Other treaties which
either link the standard to international law without specifying custom,
or lack any reference to international law, could, depending on the
context of the parties' intent, for example, be read as giving the standard
a scope of application that is broader than the minimum standard as
defined by international customary law.
See also Jack J. Coe, Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA's Investment
Chapter, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Mar. 13-16, 2002), in 2002 AM. Soc. INT'L L.: PRO. OF THE 96TH ANNUAL MEETING 9,
18 ("Broadly speaking, then, there are two textual families, the most prolific by far
being those in which the fair and equitable treatment provision - though often
combined with other guarantees- is not explicitly linked to international law.").
54 See, e.g., Award, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 98, ICSID (W. Bank) (Apr. 30, 2004):
the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is
infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or
racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which
offends judicial propriety-as might be the case with a manifest failure of
natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack of transparency
and candour in an administrative process.
(emphasis added); Loewen Group v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
132, Arbitral Tribunal (2003) (defining the minimum standard of treatment in the
context of judicial proceedings as requiring "[mianifest injustice in the sense of
lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial
propriety."); Yannaca-Small, supra note 7, at 40 ("Most of the arbitral opinions
[interpreting fair and equitable treatment] . . . mention two elements, due
diligence and due process.").
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world ... .The United States is presumably one of the principal legal
systems of the world. The arbitral decisions that have interpreted
the minimum standard of treatment, however, suggest that it could
potentially provide significantly greater rights than the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution, particularly with regard to substantive due
process. The standard for substantive due process review of
economic regulations under the Constitution is extremely
deferential and requires only that legislation bear some rational
relationship to the objectives of the legislature. 56 A court will not
use substantive due process review to "sit as a superlegislature"
and strike down laws that it considers to be unwise, inefficient, or
57
unfair.
The content of the minimum standard of treatment is less clear,
but appears to permit a more aggressive review of economic
legislation. One line of tribunal decisions, for example, has
indicated that the minimum standard of treatment imposes a duty
on governments not to change legal standards that were in effect
55 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5(2)(a), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf [hereinafter Model
U.S. BIT] (emphasis added). See also Central American Free Trade Agreement art.
10.5(2)(a), Aug. 5, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 [hereinafter CAFTAI (containing similar
provisions); U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 10.4(2)(a), May 6, 2003, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ ChileFTA/FinalTexts/
SectionIndex.html [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA] (containing similar provisions);
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement art. 15.5(2)(a), June 6, 2003, available at
http:/ /www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SingaporeFTA/Fina
lTexts/assetjuploadjfile708_4036.pdf (containing similar provisions).
56 See Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 639 (1993) ("[U]nder the deferential standard of review
applied in substantive due process challenges to economic legislation there is no
need for mathematical precision in the fit between justification and means.");
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.").
57 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978) ("[Tlhe Due
Process Clause does not empower the judiciary to sit as a superlegislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). See
also Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537-538 (1998) (quoting Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)) ("The day is gone when this
Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down ... laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought.").
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when a foreign investment was made. 58 Under substantive due
process analysis, in contrast, governments are generally free to
change regulatory standards in response to changed circumstances
59
or priorities.
In addition to its inclusion of an international version of
substantive due process, another area of apparent consensus
concerning the minimum standard of treatment is that it is a
continuously evolving concept, and that this evolution is driven to
58 See Award, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Ecuador,
191
(UNCITRAL Arb.) (2004) (stating that under fair and equitable treatment "there is
certainly an obligation not to alter the legal and business environment in which
the investment has been made"); see also id. 183 ("[T]he stability of the legal and
business framework is... an essential element of fair and equitable treatment.");
Award of May 12, 2005, CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Argentine Republic,
Case No. ARB/01/8,
274, ICSID (W. Bank) (2005) ("There can be no doubt,
therefore, that a stable legal and business environment is an essential element of
fair and equitable treatment."); Award of May 29, 2003, Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, 154, ICSID
(W. Bank) (2003) (indicating that an investor must "know beforehand any and all
rules and regulations that will govern its investments"). This purported right
against legal changes that adversely affect an investment "is an objective
requirement that does not depend on whether the [government] has proceeded in
good faith or not." Occidental, 186. See also CMS, 280 ("[T]his in an objective
requirement unrelated to whether [a government] has had any deliberate
intention or bad faith objective in adopting the measures in question.").
Interestingly, the tribunals in both Occidental and CMS cited United Mexican
States v. Metalclad Corp. in support of their interpretation of fair and equitable
treatment. See Occidental,
185; CMS,
278. The Supreme Court of British
Columbia, however, rejected the Metalclad tribunal's conclusions regarding fair
and equitable treatment as inappropriately construing NAFTA's minimum
standard of treatment provision to incorporate transparency provisions contained
in other sections of NAFTA. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001
B.C.T.C. 664, $T 66-76. The court had jurisdiction under Canada's International
Commercial Arbitration Act to review the award on certain grounds because the
parties had designated Vancouver, B.C. as the place of the arbitration. Id. 1.
59 In addition to the highly deferential standard for challenges to economic
regulations (see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text), the limited scope of
economic interests that are subject to substantive due process protection also
presents a significant obstacle to claims against changed regulatory standards.
Under the "entitlement rule," a party usually may not bring a substantive due
process challenge to an economic measure unless the measure adversely affects a
legal entitlement (e.g., a vested property right) of the party. See Daniel R.
Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old Versus New Propertyin Land
Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 61, 78-80 (2000) (describing how the courts
apply the entitlement rule to land use proposals). The scope of "investment" that
is subject to the minimum standard of treatment, in contrast, is extremely broad,
and appears to include such generalized interests as the interest in conducting
business or making a profit. See Matthew C. Porterfield, International Expropriation
Rules and Federalism, 23 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 44-54 (2004) (discussing the broad
scope of economic interests protected under Chapter 11 of NAFTA).
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a large extent by the decisions of arbitral tribunals. In Mondev v.
United States, the tribunal indicated that because of developments
in international law the minimum standard of treatment could no
longer be confined to the "egregious" conduct proscribed under
Neer:
Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s,
when the status of the individual in international law, and
the international protection of foreign investments, were far
less developed than they have since come to be. In
particular, both the substantive and procedural rights of the
law have undergone
in international
individual
the light of these
In
development.
considerable
developments it is unconvincing to confine the meaning of
"fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" of foreign investments to what those terms-had
they been current at the time-might have meant in the
1920s when applied to the physical security of an alien. To
the modem eye, what is unfair or inequitable need not
equate with the outrageous or the egregious. In particular,
a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and
60
inequitably without necessarily acting in bad faith.
The Mondev tribunal cautioned that the "evolutionary
potential" 61 of the minimum standard of treatment did not provide
a tribunal with an "unfettered discretion to decide for itself, on a
subjective basis, what was 'fair' or 'equitable' . . . without reference
to established sources of law." 62 The tribunal, however, identified
"the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals" 63 as such a source.
The tribunal in ADF Group, Inc. v. United States similarly
observed that all three NAFTA Parties agreed that "customary
international law... is not 'frozen in time' and that the minimum
standard of treatment does evolve." 64 The ADF tribunal further
noted that:

60 Award, Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
116, ICSID (W. Bank) (Oct. 11, 2002).
119.
61 Id. at
62 Id.

Id.
64 Award, ADF Group Inc. v. United States, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 450, 527 (an.
9, 2003).
63
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what customary international law projects is not a static
photograph of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens
as it stood in 1927 when the Award in the Neer case was
rendered. For both customary international law and the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens it incorporates, are
constantly in a process of development.65
As in Mondev, the ADF tribunal specifically referred to arbitral
case law as a source of law guiding the evolution of the minimum
standard.6 6 Numerous commentators have similarly noted both
the evolutionary character of the minimum standard of treatment
and the role of arbitral tribunals in determining the course of that
evolution. 67 Significantly, it is implicit in this concept of an
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
Id. at 530. The tribunal also identified state practice, judicial case law, and
"other sources of customary or general international law" as factors in the
evolution of the minimum standard of treatment (Id.), but failed to elaborate on
how these sources had influenced the development of the minimum standard
other than quoting Mondev's reference to the role of bilateral investment treaties.
ADF, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 529-30. However, as discussed supra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text, although BITs may establish the minimum standard of
treatment as an international legal obligation, they do little to define the minimum
standard's content.
67 See, e.g., Sornarajah, supra note 7, at 318 ("[A]rbitral tribunals have
independently created 'law' through their awards asserting the existence of an
international minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including foreign
investors."). See also id. at 329 ("Tribunals have asserted that they ... have a
creative function to perform .... The difficulty in this approach is whether the
tribunal will perform a near-legislative function . . . in identifying areas of
international minimum standard."); Thomas W. Walde, Investment Arbitration
under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Selected Key Issues based on Recent
Litigation Experience,
in
19 STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMic LAW:
ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPuTEs 193, 207 (Norbert Horn ed., 2004)
("[N]o self-respecting tribunal would interpret the standard as it was done in
1926, but rather sees it as an 'evolutionary' standard reflecting the expected
minimum expectation in the 21st century or the contemporary notion of what is
'fair' and what is 'equitable."'); Yannaca-Small, supra note 7, at 40 ("[T]he
minimum standard refers to an evolving international customary law which is not
'frozen' in time, but may evolve over time depending on the general and
consistent practice of states and opinio juris, as may be reflected in jurisprudence
related to the interpretation and application of these treaties."); Patrick G.Foy and
Robert J.C. Deane, Foreign Investment Protection under Investment Treaties: Recent
Developments under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 16 ICSID
REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 299, 317 (2001) ("The customary international law
norms regarding fair and equitable treatment of foreign nationals and their
property are evolving."); Franck, supra note 23, at 1617 ("Arbitrators inevitably
create 'new international law' founded on the norms present in investment
treaties when they apply the substantive rights in investment treaties to the facts
of actual disputes.").
65
66
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"evolutionary" minimum standard of treatment that the scope of
68
foreign investor rights will continue to expand.
Charles H. Brower, II has argued that the term "fair and
equitable treatment" constitutes "an intentionally vague term,
designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to
articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty's object
and purpose in particular disputes." 69 As discussed below,
whether its vagueness is intentional or not, the minimum standard
of treatment remains highly indeterminate, calling into question its
legitimacy as a norm of international law.
4.

THE VAGUENESS AND DELEGATION PROBLEMS

4.1. The Vagueness Problem
Although an international "void for vagueness" doctrine has
never been fully articulated, it is implicit in the concept of binding
international legal norms (or norms at all, for that matter) that they
have identifiable content. Thomas Franck has argued that in order
for an international legal standard to be legitimate, it must provide
reasonably clear guidance concerning the nature of the obligation
that it imposes. 70 Franck equates determinacy with transparency:
68 See Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable
Treatment in InternationalInvestment Law, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 297, 320

(2005):
[Aiccepting the evolving nature of the definition of fair and equitable
treatment will also require governments to accept that, over time, the
concept will gradually take on a more liberal and expansive scope. Thus,
the breadth of grounds under which foreign investors are covered will
continue to grow as the definition of the standard evolves. Expanding
the scope of protection for foreign investors will also lead to a
corresponding decrease in a State's ability to act at will.
69 Brower, supra note 32, at 66 n. 163. See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, UNITED
STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE 76 (1992) ("The phrase [fair
and equitable treatment] is vague and its precise content will have to be defined
over time through treaty practice, including perhaps arbitration under the dispute
provisions."); Franck, supra note 23, at 1589 (arguing that defining more precisely
the meaning of "fair and equitable treatment" in investment treaties would
"sacrifice the flexibility and equity that exists in the present system and may also
prematurely stunt the development of new areas of law"); cf.SORNARAJAH, supra
note 7, at 329 ("The issue will always be whether such a mandate to [define the
minimum standard of treatment for foreign investment] was intentionally given
to arbitral tribunals.").
70 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 57
(1990) ("To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is permitted and
what conduct is out of bounds.").
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The pre-eminent literary property affecting legitimacy is
the rule text's determinacy: that which makes its message
clear.
The same quality may also be termed its
"transparency." Logical deduction suggests . . . that rules
which are perceived to have a high degree of
determinacy -that
is, readily ascertainable normative
content-would seem to have a better chance of actually
regulating conduct in the real world than those which are
71
less determinate.
The United States has also recognized the need for
international legal standards to have clearly defined content. In
submissions to the WTO rejecting the assertion that the
precautionary principle constitutes a rule of CIL, the United States
has asserted that in order to constitute a norm of international law,
a legal standard must have a "single, agreed formulation." 72 In the
absence of consensus on its meaning, a legal standard cannot be
considered a "rule" because "it has no clear content and therefore
cannot be said to provide any authoritative guide for a State's
conduct." 73 Moreover, if a legal standard is not sufficiently
determinate to constitute a binding norm,
it is a fortiori not a rule of customary international law....
[because] it cannot be said to reflect the practice of States, as
it cannot even be uniformly defined by those who espouse
it... [and because it] cannot even be defined and, therefore,
could not possibly be a legal norm, one could not argue that
States follow it from a sense of legal obligation. 74
The federal courts have similarly recognized the need for
international rules to have a well-defined content by declining to
give domestic legal effect to vague international legal standards.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,75 the Supreme Court rejected a claim
brought against the United States based on an alleged violation of
CIL, on the grounds that the purported customary standard lacked
sufficient "specificity" to be enforceable in U.S. courts. The claim
Id. at 52.
Rebuttal Submission of the United States, European Communities- Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 22 WT/DS291, 292-93,
(July 19, 2004).
73 Id. at 23.
74 Id.
75 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
71

72
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was brought by a Mexican national under the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), which provides federal courts with jurisdiction to hear
claims by aliens for torts "committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 76 The plaintiff argued that
his abduction and transportation to the United States to be
prosecuted for the murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration
agent violated a CIL prohibition on detentions of foreign nationals
77 The Court
that are not authorized by a nation's domestic law.
held that in order to be cognizable under the ATS, a norm of
international law must be "defined with a specificity" comparable
to the narrow class of international offenses (e.g., violation of safe
conducts, abuse of ambassadors, and piracy) that were
contemplated by Congress when the ATS was first enacted in
1789.78 The prohibition on unauthorized detentions asserted by the
plaintiff, the Court concluded, did not constitute a "norm of
customary international law so well defined as to support the creation
79
of a federal remedy."
The federal courts have also declined to give vague
international treaty provisions domestic legal effect-i.e., to
interpret them as being "self-executing." 80 In American Baptist
Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, for example, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that the
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War did not provide Salvadoran and
81
Guatemalan nationals with a right of refuge in the United States.
The court noted that the relevant treaty provision lacked
"intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement" and "[was]
'phrased in broad generalities' and contain[ed] no 'rules by which
' 82
private rights may be determined.'
Although the question of the domestic enforceability of
international rules is distinct from the legitimacy of those rules at
the international level, the same need for legal standards to
76

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).

Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735-36.
Id. at 725.
79 Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
80 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 713 (1995) ("[Treaties may be held unenforceable if they do not]
set forth sufficiently determinate standards for evaluating the conduct of the
parties and their attendant rights and liabilities.").
81 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
82 Id. at 770 (internal citations omitted).
77
78
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provide "intelligible guidelines" that has led the federal courts to
reject the domestic enforcement of vague international rules argues
against the legitimacy of these standards at the international level.
Accordingly, because it lacks a clearly defined content, the
minimum standard of treatment cannot constitute a legitimate
norm of international law.
4.2. The Process Determinacy Solution
Thomas Franck has suggested that international standards that
lack sufficient "textual determinacy" may achieve "process
determinacy" and therefore legitimacy through interpretation by a
process that is perceived as legitimate. 83 Commentators have
embraced Franck's process determinacy approach as a solution to
the vagueness of the minimum standard of treatment, either
arguing that the existing system of ad hoc tribunals can gradually
provide more guidance concerning the content of the standard,8 4 or
calling for the creation of a new appellate body that would be
charged with "supervising the development of a coherent body of
law among the various tribunals." 85 Congress has endorsed the
latter approach, instructing the Office of the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR") to ensure that future trade agreements to
which the United States is a party "provid[e] for an appellate body
83 See FRANCK, supra note 70, at 61-66; see also infra notes 109-110 and
accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., Ari Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of InternationalInvestment: How
NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Crisis, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 51, 88 (2004) ("NAFTA panels may, through a common law interpretation
of Chapter 11, draw upon principles born out of experience with international
trade in order to confine Chapter 11 to its proper domain.").
85 Brower, supra note 32, at 91; see also Frederick M. Abbott, The Political
Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of
North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 303, 308 (2000)
("One solution to a potential Chapter 11 legitimacy problem would be to
constitute an Appellate Body composed, for example, of the Chief Justices of the
three nations' Supreme Courts."); Coe, supra note 38, at 1453 ("[T]here is reason to
hold that an appellate mechanism of some kind [for NAFTA Chapter 11
arbitrations] would be beneficial."); Franck, supra note 23, at 1617 ("A single,
unified, permanent body charged with developing international law and creating
consistent jurisprudence will promote legitimacy more than disaggregated
arbitrations that come to different conclusions on the same issue."). Alwyn V.
Freeman made a similar proposal almost 70 years ago, suggesting that the
international standard for "denial of justice" could be clarified by having disputes
decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which could gradually
develop "a consistent body of legal principles readily applicable to specific cases."
Freeman, supra note 15, at 570.
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or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of
86
investment provisions."
This new appellate body presumably would provide more
consistent guidance on the evolving content of the minimum
standard of treatment than the current system of ad hoc tribunals
but would nonetheless still be engaged in the essentially "creative"
process of defining the standard's content. 87 As discussed below,
even if this delegation of authority to an appellate body could, over
time, solve the problem of the vagueness of the minimum standard
of treatment, it would result in a new and illegitimate form of
an international common law of investor
international law:
88
rights.
4.3. The Delegation Problem
An international minimum standard of treatment created by
arbitral tribunals (or an appellate body) through a common law
process is difficult to justify as consistent with basic principles of
either international or United States law. There are two generally
recognized sources of binding international law - treaties and
CIL. 89 Under the dominant Westphalian view of international law,
86 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(3)(G)(iv), 116 Stat. 933,
955 (2002). Although no appellate body for investment disputes has yet been
created, recent U.S. free trade agreements have included language indicating that
the parties will engage in negotiations concerning the establishment of such a
body. See, e.g., U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 55, Annex 10-H, at 10-36 ("Within three
years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall consider
whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review
awards rendered under Article 10.25 in arbitrations commenced after they
establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.").
87 See Brower, supra note 32, at 66 (discussing the "creative, rather than purely
analytical" role of tribunals in interpreting the standard for fair and equitable
treatment).
commentators have noted the similarities between the
88 Several
development of common law and the process used by arbitral tribunals to identify
and define the content of investors' rights under international law. See, e.g., Coe,
supra note 38, at 1407 ("Many of the awards [under chapter 11 of NAFTA] seem to
share, methodologically, a common law influence. Despite the absence of stare
decisis, prior awards have often been carefully dissected, sometimes cited with
approval, and sometimes distinguished on their facts.") (internal citation omitted);
David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the
United States- Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 708 (2004)
(" [M]embers of the tribunals ... routinely cite, distinguish, agree with, or discount
decisions of prior tribunals.") (internal citation omitted).
89 Article 38 of the Charter of the United Nations is frequently cited for the
proposition that there are actually four categories of international law, including
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" and "judicial decisions
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both derive their legitimacy from the consent of States. 90
An international common law of investor rights, in contrast,
lacks the legitimacy provided by State consent. The consent of
States to participation in treaties that contain minimum standard of
treatment provisions cannot reasonably be said to constitute
consent to the specific content of the minimum standard of
treatment, given that that content is largely indeterminate and is
continuously evolving through the decisions of tribunals. Instead,
States can only be considered to have consented to the minimum
standard of treatment to the extent that they have agreed to the
arbitral process for determining the content of the standard and
applying that evolving standard in particular disputes.
As a matter of United States law, consenting to bind the nation
to certain international rules is an essentially legislative act and
therefore can only be done by Congress-the politically
accountable representatives of the people (or by the Senate, in the
case of Article II treaties).91 Congress inappropriately delegates
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" in addition to treaties
and CIL. See U.N. Charter art. 38, 1(c)-(d). Neither "general principles of law"
nor judicial decisions and the writings of highly qualified publicists, however,
constitute primary sources of binding international norms. "General principles of
law" refers to principles that are common to the "major legal systems ... which
may be invoked as supplementary rules of international law when appropriate."
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §

102(4) (1987). General principles of law are not binding international legal
obligations, but rather constitute "a secondary source of law, resorted to for
developing international law interstitially in special circumstances." Id. at § 102.4
cmt. 1. Similarly, "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists" are not sources of international legal obligation, but rather "opinionevidence as to whether some rule has in fact become or been accepted as
international law." Id. at § 102 rep. note 1.
90 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, pt. 1, ch. 1, intro (1987) ("Modem international law is rooted in acceptance
by states which constitute the system. Specific rules of law also depend on state
acceptance."); LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 27 (1995)
("State consent is the foundation of international law. The principle that law is
binding on a state only by its consent remains an axiom of the political system, an
implication of state autonomy."); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory
of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1833 (2002) ("[P]robably the most
commonly held rationale for the relevance of international law to national
conduct... is based on the notion of consent."). The view that CIL is based on
state consent is not universally shared; an alternative account holds that CIL
derives its authority from the consensus of nations. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 510.
91 In areas that are within the scope of executive authority, the President may
also enter into international agreements -know as "sole executive agreements" without obtaining the consent of Congress (or of the Senate). See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 648 (3d ed. 2003) ("At the very least, the
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this legislative authority when it consents to U.S. participation in
power to
FTAs and BITs that effectively confer on tribunals the 92
define the content of the minimum standard of treatment.
In practice, the nondelegation doctrine has not imposed a
significant restraint on legislative action since the 1930s. 93 The
Supreme Court has approved delegations of rulemaking authority
subject only to the requirements that there be evidence of
Congressional intent to make the delegation 94 and that Congress
provide some "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the
95
delegated power.
Arguably, however, the discretion conferred on international
tribunals to define the content of the minimum standard of
treatment violates even these minimal criteria for permissible
delegations. In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress did delegate to the
President is empowered to employ executive agreements within the penumbras of
enumerated presidential powers, as, for example, when invoking the Commander
in Chief power to justify an armistice agreement.").
92 Congress also, of course, delegates an adjudicative function to investment
tribunals, which may implicate the authority of the federal judiciary under Article
III of the Constitution. Compare Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564-66
(2003) (discussing potential Article III limitations on delegations of judicial
authority to international tribunals), with Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality
of InternationalDelegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1532 (2004) (suggesting that
critics of delegations of judicial authority to international bodies "must confront
the longstanding practice of employing international arbitral tribunals, which
appear to have been controversial more because of their sometimes legislative
character than due to any distinct Article III issue.") (citation omitted).
93 See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001)
("In the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle'
lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the
exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the
entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring 'fair competition.'") (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935) and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935)).
94 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). See also Michael
P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 128586 (2002) ("[A] purported statutory delegation must . . . reflect a congressional
intent to confer developmental authority ... ").
95 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle . . . such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."). Congress
has been extremely deferential in its application of the "intelligible principle"
standard. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 22526 (1943) (rejecting claim that Congress's grant of authority to the Federal
Communications Commission to regulate radio broadcasting "in the public
interest" constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority).
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USTR the authority to negotiate trade agreements containing
"standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with United
States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due
process... ."96 Congress's attempt to link the standard for fair and
equitable treatment to due process was part of a broader
instruction to the USTR to "ensur[e] that foreign investors in the
United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with
respect to investment protections than United States investors in
the United States ... . 97 This delegation of negotiating authority to
the USTR cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidence of a
Congressional intent to delegate to international tribunals the
authority to develop (as opposed to apply) a body of international
rules governing the treatment of foreign investors. Nor can such
intent be inferred from Congressional approval of FTAs and BITs
containing minimum standard of treatment provisions.
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that Congress has provided an
"intelligible principle" that guides the development of this
international common law.
The USTR has responded to
Congress's mandate in the Trade Act by including language in
recent FTAs that states that the "fair and equitable treatment"
component of the minimum standard of treatment includes the
right to due process. 98 Nonetheless, these FTAs still define the
minimum standard of treatment primarily by reference to
customary international law, 99 which continues to "evolve"
independent of any congressional guidance. 100 The principal
reference points for identifying the relevant standards under CIL
are the decisions of previous tribunals, which have interpreted the
minimum standard of treatment- Congress's "no greater rights"
directive notwithstanding- to provide significantly greater rights
than the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution.' 0'
Arguably, the nondelegation doctrine should apply with
particular force when authority is delegated to international
bodies. A central principle underlying the nondelegation doctrine
96 Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 2102(b)(3)(E), 116 Stat. 933
(codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).

97

Id. § 2102(b)(3).

98 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 55, art. 10.5(1) ("Each Party shall accord to
covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law..
."); U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 55, art. 10.4(1) (same).
100 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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is that Congress should not be permitted to avoid political
responsibility for controversial decisions by conferring the
authority to make those decisions on either another branch of
government or some entity outside the government. 102 The typical
delegation occurs when Congress directs an administrative agency
to develop regulations to implement some broad congressional
directive. In this situation, the delegation is to an agent of a
coordinate branch of government, which is also ultimately
accountable to the electorate. 103 Delegations to international
bodies, in contrast, confer authority on decision makers who "are
at least less democratically accountable than are U.S. political
institutions to U.S. citizens." 104
The delegation of the authority to define the content of the
minimum standard of treatment to a system of ad hoc arbitral
tribunals is particularly problematic. A standing institution, such
as an appellate body, would at least provide a target at which the
102 See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[The nondelegation doctrine] ensures to the extent
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will."). See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980) ("That legislators often find it
convenient to escape accountability is precisely the reason for a nondelegation
doctrine.").
103 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 323
(2000) ("Agencies are themselves democratically accountable via the President...
104 Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1566 (2004) (emphasis omitted). See also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S.
Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989, 2002 (2004):

In the case of domestic delegations -even those that license a fair degree
of autonomy for administrative agencies - there are significant checks on
agency behavior in the form of appropriations, oversight, amending
legislation, and publicity. These checks are obviously weaker at the
international level -particularly the ability of the United States to
overturn decisions of transnational bodies, which would require the
amendment of a treaty.
See also Bradley, supra note 92, at 1574 ("[I1t is arguable that international
delegations . . . should be subject to greater scrutiny because the institutions
exercising rulemaking authority do not possess independent constitutional power
and are less accountable than domestic officials to the U.S. electorate."); see also
Kelly, supra note 3, at 530 ("[Tlhe allocation of lawmaking authority to [an
international] tribunal seriously undermines the democratic legitimation of law.
There is no legislature or other effective means of overturning judge-made law
and of making ... tribunal decisions accountable to the popular will of states or
their people.").
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public and its political representatives could direct their criticism
regarding the evolution of the minimum standard of treatment.
The incremental development of a common law of investor
protection by ad hoc tribunals diffuses accountability even further
10 5
by making it difficult to identify the relevant decision maker.
Moreover, the broad scope of government measures to which
the minimum standard of treatment applies raises significant
nondelegation concerns. The Supreme Court has indicated that
"the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according
the
to the scope of the power congressionally conferred" 0 6 -i.e.
broader the scope of the delegated authority, the more specific the
"intelligible principle" guiding the exercise of that authority must
be.
Under the FTAs and the BITS, the minimum standard of
treatment has enormous scope-it does not apply only to a
regulatory area, but rather to any government
particular 107
"measure,"
which is defined broadly to include "any law,
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice." 08 Accordingly,
given the broad range of government activities that are subject to
the minimum standard of treatment, the lack of control by
politically accountable actors over the content of the standard is
particularly inappropriate.
Thomas Franck has suggested a different approach to
evaluating the legitimacy of international legal standards that
depends on neither the consent of states nor the political
accountability of those charged with creating the standards.
Franck argues that the legitimacy of international rules can be
105 See Brower, supra note 32, at 93 ("[Bly their very nature, ad hoc tribunals
tend to be relatively less accountable, transparent, and accessible to democratic
processes than permanent tribunals"); see also id. at 91 (referring to advantages of a
standing appellate body as potentially including a "developed sense of
accountability").

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 37, art. 1101 (defining NAFTA's investment
provisions scope and coverage as applying "to measures adopted or maintained
by a Party relating to . . . investors of another Party . . . [or] investments of
investors of another party in the territory of the Party .... "); U.S.-Chile FTA, supra
note 55, art. 10.1(1) ("This Chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained by
a Party relating to: (a) investors of the other Party; [and] (b) covered investments.
. ."); see
. also Model U.S. BIT, supra note 55, art. 2(1) ("This Treaty applies to
measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors of the other
Party; [and] (b) covered investments ... ").
108 NAFTA, supra note 37, art. 201; see also Model U.S. BIT, art. 1 (same); U.S.106

107

Chile FTA, supra note 55, art. 2:1 (same).
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109

determined by examining whether the rule "exerts a pull toward
compliance on those addressed normatively because those
addressed believe that the rule . . . has come into being and
operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right
process." 109 Franck identifies four criteria for evaluating the
legitimacy of an international rule:
pedigree, determinacy, coherence and adherence .... [Pledigree
refers to the depth of the rule's roots in a historical process;
determinacy refers to the rule's ability to communicate
content; coherence refers to the rule's internal consistency
and lateral connectedness to the principles underlying
other rules; and adherence refers to the rule's vertical
connectedness to a normative hierarchy, culminating in an
ultimate rule of recognition, which embodies the principled
110
purposes and values that define the community of states.
Whatever the merits of Franck's theory of "right process," it
does not address the need for those creating international legal
standards to be politically accountable, and is therefore inadequate
to support the participation in international legal regimes by the
United States.
Nonetheless, there are several plausible grounds for rejecting
the nondelegation critique of an international common law of
It could be argued that there is nothing
investor rights.
extraordinary about the role played by arbitral tribunals in
providing guidance on the content of the minimum standard of
treatment, given that tribunals are routinely required to interpret
similarly vague provisions such as the prohibition on "indirect
No other standard of investor protection,
expropriation.""'
however, confers on arbitrators such a widely acknowledged
"quasi-legislative authority" 112 to define its content.
FRANCK, supra note 70, at 24 (emphasis omitted).
110 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to DemocraticGovernment, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46, 51 (1992).
111 See Tcnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States,
114 ICSID (W. Bank) (May 29, 2003), available at
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
indirect
that
(noting
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Tecnicas_001.pdf
expropriation "do[esl not have a clear or unequivocal definition .... "); see also
Dolzer supra note 6, at 100 ("ITihere is no clear definition of the concept of indirect
expropriation. . . . Instead,] it is generally accepted that a wide variety of
measures are susceptible to lead to indirect expropriation and each case is
therefore likely to be decided on the basis of its attending circumstances.").
112 Brower, supra note 32, at 66 n. 163.
109
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Another possible response to the nondelegation critique is that
domestic courts frequently play a similar lawmaking role when
engaged in developing common law principles or in interpreting
vague statutory provisions. State and federal court interpretations
of vague statutes and common law principles, however, are subject
to legislative revision. In contrast, an international minimum
standard of treatment developed through a common law
methodology (either by tribunals or a standing appellate body) is
much less susceptible to modification by Congress, principally
because modification would require the cooperation and consent of
other nations. 113 Moreover, the analogy to domestic common law
is particularly inapt given that the international arbitral system is
formally non-precedential, 114 leaving each tribunal to determine to
what extent it finds the pronouncements of previous tribunals on
15
the nature of the minimum standard of treatment persuasive.
A third potential response to the nondelegation critique is that
minimum standard of treatment provisions are not "self113 See Kelly, supra note 3, at 529 ("The only effective way to overturn
[international] judicial lawmaking is for nations to negotiate a multilateral treaty.
As a practical matter, there are large transaction costs to this strategy .... ").
Interpretive statements, such as that adopted by NAFTA's Free Trade
Commission concerning the minimum standard of treatment, are another option
in addition for formal amendments of treaties. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United
Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
91, ICSID (W. Bank) (Apr. 30, 2004)
(noting that the Free Trade Commission's interpretation "resolves any dispute"
concerning the minimum standard of treatment in international law).
114 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 37, at 296 art. 1136(1) ("An award made by a
Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in
respect of the particular case."); U.S.-Chile F.T.A., supra note 55, at 10-22 ("An
award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the
disputing parties and in respect of the particular case."). The lack of precedential
effect of the decisions of tribunals in investment disputes is consistent with the
general approach to precedent in international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 103 cmt. b (1987) ("[Tlhe
traditional view [is] that there is no stare decisis in international law ...
[However,] to the extent that decisions of international tribunals adjudicate
questions of international law, they are persuasive evidence of what the law is.").
115 See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Mis3Zuided Quest for an International "Regulatory
Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 55 n. 117 (2003) (arguing that the arbitral
process under NAFTA chapter 11 is distinguishable from domestic common law
because "insofar as the tribunals are not bound by stare decisis and are not subject
to centralized appellate review" and there is "no guarantee that delegation... to
adjudicative development will result in anything approaching uniform
standards").
The creation of a standing appellate body, however, could
presumably help to harmonize the interpretation of the minimum standard of
treatment.
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executing" -i.e. they do not have domestic legal effect, but rather
only define the obligations of the United States to foreign investors
as a matter of international law. 11 6 This argument, however,
depends on questionable legal and functional premises. BITs,
including the minimum standard of treatment provisions they
contain, are apparently intended to be self-executing." 7 Similarly,
Congress has specified in the implementing legislation for NAFTA
and other FTAs that contain a minimum standard of treatment
article, that the federal government may sue to have a state or local
law declared invalid based its inconsistency with a trade or
investment rule." 8 In addition to their potential use to preempt
See Bradley, supra note 92, at 1587 ("At least some . .. [international]
delegation concerns ... can be addressed by presuming that the decisions and
rulings of international institutions are 'non-self-executing'- that is, they do not
create enforceable federal law unless and until they are implemented by
Congress.").
117 See, e.g., United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Egypt, art.
11(7), Mar. 11, 1986, S.TREATY Doc. No. 99-24 (1986) ("Each Party shall grant to
nationals or companies of the other Party . . . the right of access to its courts of
justice, administrative tribunals and agencies, and all other bodies exercising
adjudicatory authority . . .for the purpose of asserting claims, and enforcing
rights, with respect to their investments."); Model U.S. BIT, supra note 55, art.
11(5)(a) ("Each Party shall establish or maintain judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose of the prompt review and,
where warranted, correction of final administrative actions regarding matters
covered by this Treaty."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 111 n. 5 (1987) ("Provisions in treaties ... conferring
rights on foreign nationals, especially in matters ordinarily governed by State law,
have been given effect without any implementing legislation, their self-executing
character assumed without discussion."); VANDEVELDE, supra note 69, at 113-16
(discussing the right to access to domestic courts under the U.S. BITs).
118 See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act §
102(b)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2000) (providing that a state and local law or its
application may be declared invalid based on its inconsistency with a provision of
NAFTA "in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring
such law or application invalid"); see also, e.g., The U.S.-Chile Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act § 102(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2000) ("No State law,
or the application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or
circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with
the Agreement, except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose
of declaring such law or application invalid.").
There is, however, at least one potential constitutional obstacle to the
preemption of state and locals laws under the minimum standard of treatment.
As noted supra, the minimum standard of treatment can function like a
heightened version of substantive due process (see supra notes 56-59 and
accompanying text), and it applies to essentially any government measure (see
supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text). Accordingly, the courts could decline
to give it preemptive effect on the grounds that to do so would permit Congress to
effectively expand the limitations on state authority imposed by the Due Process
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state laws, minimum standard of treatment provisions also can
have a domestic legal effect in the form of imposing a financial
liability on the federal government for the payment of arbitral
awards.11 9
Moreover, even as a purely international obligation, the
minimum standard of treatment raises significant nondelegation
concerns. 120 International liability for violations of the minimum
standard of treatment-as developed and defined by arbitral
tribunals-can reasonably be expected to affect how domestic
policy makers exercise their authority. Given the indeterminacy of
the standard's content, it is impossible to determine whether the
practice of nations with regard to the minimum standard of
treatment conforms with Louis Henkin's dictum that "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."' 21
Presumably, however, Congress and the President would feel
some compulsion -whether dispositive or not-to alter a federal
law that had been found by a tribunal to violate the minimum
standard of treatment. 22
Clause without following the procedures prescribed for amending the
Constitution in Article V. See Porterfield, supra note 59, at 70-86 (2004) (discussing
potential limits under Article V on preemptive effect of international
expropriation rules that effectively amend the Takings Clause of the Constitution).
119 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 37, at art. 1351 ("Where a Tribunal makes a
final award against a Party, the Tribunal may award . . . monetary damages and
any applicable interest ... ").
120 It should be noted that the nondelegation doctrine is unlikely to impose
any judicially enforceable limits on the ability of the United States government to
delegate the authority to make rules that do not have domestic legal effect. See
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(finding that President Carter's decision to terminate a mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan constituted a nonjusticiable political question); Made in the USA Found.
v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the constitutionality
of Congress's approval of NAFTA by a simple majority vote in each House rather
than by a supermajority in the Senate under art. II, sec. 2 of the Constitution
presented a political question).
121 Louis Henkin, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
122 See David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative,
Executive and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1735 (2003):
[Olnce an international obligation is created, Congress's freedom of
action is significantly limited. It can only refuse to implement the
resolution of such an international body if it is willing baldly to
disregard an acknowledged international legal obligation. Unless the
non-self-execution view is coupled with a skeptical view about the status
or even the existence of international law, then, non-self-execution, at
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CONCLUSION

The explanation for the minimum standard of treatment's
purported status as a binding norm of international law has
changed repeatedly over the years. The minimum standard has its
origins in the ancient doctrine of denial of justice, and was
accepted during the 17th and 18th century as part of the (natural
law-based) law of nations. Beginning in the 19th century, it was
viewed as part of customary international law derived from state
practice. Over the last half-century, it has become a prevalent
treaty obligation through the inclusion of minimum standard of
treatment provisions in BITs and FTAs.
One aspect of the standard, however, has been consistent: its
lack of a clearly defined content. Given the indeterminacy of the
standard, it can not constitute a legitimate norm because it does
not provide governments with specific guidance concerning what
type of treatment of foreign investors is prohibited. Proponents of
the minimum standard of treatment suggest that this defect can be
cured either by permitting the existing system of ad hoc tribunals
to define the content of the standard using a common law
methodology, or by conferring that authority on a new appellate
body. This approach could conceivably resolve, or at least
mitigate, the vagueness problem. It would result, however, in the
inappropriate delegation of Congress's lawmaking authority to
international tribunals, which would be vested with the power to
create an international common law of investor rights.

most, can only diminish but not eliminate the popular sovereignty
objection.
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